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Abstract. Programs that process secret data may inadvertently reveal
information about those secrets in their publicly-observable output. This
paper presents LeakWatch, a quantitative information leakage analy-
sis tool for the Java programming language; it is based on a exible
\point-to-point" information leakage model, where secret and publicly-
observable data may occur at any time during a program's execution.
LeakWatch repeatedly executes a Java program containing both secret
and publicly-observable data and uses robust statistical techniques to
provide estimates, with condence intervals, for min-entropy leakage (us-
ing a new theoretical result presented in this paper) and mutual informa-
tion. We demonstrate how LeakWatch can be used to estimate the size
of information leaks in a range of real-world Java programs.
Keywords: Quantitative information 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mutual information, min-entropy leakage
1 Introduction
An information leak occurs when a passive observer learns something about
a system's secret data by observing its public outputs. Information leaks may
be a side eect of a correctly-functioning system, and pose no real threat to
security (e.g., a rejected guess of a secret, high-entropy password leaks some
information: that this value is not the correct password). Larger information
leaks, on the other hand, may lead to a complete breakdown of security (e.g., a
awed random number generator may give an observer all the information they
need to guess important secret values). It is therefore important for a designer
or analyst of a system to know exactly where information leaks occur and to be
able to quantify them.
Information theory is a useful mechanism for providing quantitative bounds
on what an attacker can learn. The attacker's uncertainty about a system's
secret data is usually represented as Shannon entropy [1], and the reduction in
uncertainty about the secret data is represented using a measure such as the
mutual information of the secret data and publicly-observable data [2], or the
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min-entropy leakage from the secret data to the publicly-observable data [3].
Although the bounds provided by these measures are meaningful, it is tedious
to manually compute them; there is therefore a need for tools that automatically
and robustly detect information leakage vulnerabilities in software.
This paper presents LeakWatch, a quantitative information leakage analy-
sis tool for the Java programming language. It is based on a \point-to-point"
information leakage model in which secret and publicly-observable data may oc-
cur at any time during the program's execution, including inside complex code
structures such as branches and nested loops. This model, which we developed
previously using a semantics based on discrete-time Markov chains [4], is par-
ticularly well-suited to analysing complex programs where secret and publicly-
observable data may occur at any point: if secret and publicly-observable values
are \tagged" using the secret and observe commands respectively, it measures
how much information a passive attacker with knowledge of the program's source
code learns about the secret values by examining the observable values.
Given a Java program whose source code has been annotated with the posi-
tions where its secret and publicly-observable data occurs, LeakWatch repeatedly
executes it, recording the occurrences of secret and public data, and then per-
forms robust statistical tests to detect whether an information leak is present
and, if so, estimate the size of the leak. We note that this relies on the analyst
correctly identifying which values in their program should be kept secret and
which other values might be observable to an attacker, but, assuming this is
done correctly (a reasonable assumption for most programs), LeakWatch can be
used to verify whether the program is secure, or whether it contains an informa-
tion leak that could lead to an attack.
LeakWatch uses previous techniques [5,6] for estimating mutual information
and a new technique for estimating min-entropy leakage. These are brute-force
approaches for probabilistic systems; i.e., we must run the program enough times
to collect sampled data for every possible secret value. If the systems we target
were deterministic, we could compute the information leakage precisely; however,
since they are probabilistic, we use these statistical estimation techniques to
distinguish a real information leak from noise in the measurements and to place
bounds on the possible leakage.
We note that this estimation technique is quite dierent from those that
estimate mutual information or min-entropy leakage with sampled data for only
some of the possible secrets (e.g., [7]). These results often require additional
assumptions about the distribution of the secret values, which we do not make,
and may only work for non-probabilistic systems. Practically, we can analyse
systems containing tens (or, in some cases, hundreds) of thousands of secret and
observable values that occur with a non-negligible probability, and in which each
trial run of the system is independent and identically distributed. We show that
this provides interesting results for complex systems.
We present new results for calculating when enough samples have been col-
lected for our estimates to be accurate, and handling user (but not attacker)
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method, and illustrate its power with three realistic security-themed examples.
Other tools, such as QUAIL [8], QIF [9] and our earlier CH-IMP imple-
mentation [4], compute the leakage from small formal models of programs. A
key dierence in this work is that we target full Java programs, at the cost of
estimating leakage instead of computing it precisely.
There are other information leakage tools built on model checkers for C and
Java [10,11,12]. They require the secret values to be inputs to the program and
the observable values to be the program's nal outputs; they are also restricted to
the subset of the language's syntax supported by the model checker. LeakWatch
has neither of these constraints.
In summary, our main contributions are the following:
a) a new result for estimating min-entropy leakage from trial runs of systems,
as well as providing condence intervals for those estimates using 2 tests;
b) a technique that, given certain assumptions, ensures we have enough samples
to estimate information leakage from trial runs of a system;
c) LeakWatch, a robust information leakage analysis tool that can estimate
mutual information and min-entropy leakage in Java programs; LeakWatch
is freely available at [13], with full documentation and a range of sample
Java programs.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce rele-
vant theoretical background information. In Section 3 we show a new theoretical
result for estimating min-entropy leakage and its condence interval from trial
runs of a system. In Sections 4 and 5 we discuss LeakWatch's design and imple-
mentation respectively. In Section 6 we show three examples of LeakWatch being
used to uncover information leakage vulnerabilities in real-world Java programs.
2 Background
2.1 Leakage Measures and Estimating Mutual Information
Our approach assumes that trial runs of the system are independent and iden-
tically distributed; the analyst must verify that this is the case. We also assume
the system has probabilistic behaviour: each run results in some secret values
x 2 X occurring from some probability distribution X, and some observable
behaviour y 2 Y occurring from some probability distribution Y . Then, for each
run of the system, the probability of the secrets x occurring and the attacker
observing y is given by the joint probability distribution p(x;y). The question
we wish to answer is \how much does an attacker learn about the value of the
secret from the observable behaviour of the system?".
We use two popular measures of information leakage: mutual information
and min-entropy leakage. Mutual information is given by the equation
I(X;Y ) =
X
x2X;y2Y
p(x;y)log2

p(x;y)
p(x)p(y)

(1)
and tells us how much information, in bits, we learn about X by observing Y .4 Tom Chothia, Yusuke Kawamoto, and Chris Novakovic
Min-entropy leakage is given by the equation
L(X;Y ) = log2
X
y2Y
max
x2X
p(x;y)   log2 max
x2X
X
y2Y
p(x;y) (2)
and tells us how dicult it is for the attacker to guess the secret values in one
attempt, given the observable behaviour. We refer the reader to [2] for a more in-
depth evaluation of mutual information and min-entropy leakage as information
leakage measures.
From trial runs of a system we can estimate the joint distribution ^ p(x;y) and
the distributions ^ p(x) and ^ p(y); we can use these distributions in Equation 1 to
estimate the mutual information ^ I(X;Y ). To nd bounds on the true mutual
information of the secret and observable values in a system, we need to know
how ^ I(X;Y ) relates to I(X;Y ). We have shown previously [14] how these values
are related when the distribution on secrets is known and we estimated ^ p(yjx);
however, this case is dierent, in that we are also estimating ^ p(x). This case has
been studied by Moddemeijer [5] and Brillinger [6], who found that:
Theorem 1. When I(X;Y ) = 0, for a large number of samples n, 2n^ I(X;Y )
will be drawn from a 2 distribution with (#X  1)(#Y  1) degrees of freedom;
i.e., ^ I(X;Y ) has an average value of (#X  1)(#Y  1)=2n and variance (#X  
1)(#Y   1)=2n2.
Theorem 2. When I(X;Y ) > 0, for a large number of samples n, the estimates
^ I(X;Y ) will be drawn from a distribution with mean I(X;Y )+(#X  1)(#Y  
1)=2n + O
  1
n2

and variance
1
n
0
@
X
x;y
p(x;y)log
2

p(x;y)
p(x)p(y)

 
 
X
x;y
p(x;y)log

p(x;y)
p(x)p(y)
!21
A + O

1
n2

.
Using these results, we rst test a ^ I(X;Y ) value against the 2 distribution
from Theorem 1; if it is consistent with the 95% condence interval for this
distribution, we conclude that there is no evidence of an information leak in our
sampled data. If ^ I(X;Y ) is inconsistent with the distribution from Theorem 1,
we conclude that there is evidence of an information leak in our sampled data
and use Theorem 2 to calculate a condence interval for the leakage.
In both cases \a large number of samples" means enough samples to ensure
that every ^ p(x;y) is close to p(x;y), so it is important to note that this is a brute-
force approach that requires many more samples than the product of the number
of secret and observable values. The contribution of the estimation results is to
allow us to analyse systems that behave probabilistically.
The O(n 2) term in Theorem 2 is an innite sum on descending powers of
n. This term is a result of using the Taylor expansion of entropy and conditional
entropy. To make use of Theorem 2 we require enough samples for the O(n 2)
term to be small. This will always be the case for a suciently large n, and we
address how to tell when n is large enough in Section 4.1. In practice, these results
let us analyse systems with tens of thousands of unique secrets and observables.LeakWatch: Estimating Information Leakage from Java Programs 5
2.2 Our Information Leakage Model
Our tool uses a \point-to-point" information leakage model, which tells us how
much an attacker learns about a secret value at a particular point in a program
from the program's observable outputs. This model is particularly well-suited to
analysing entire programs (rather than code fragments), and it is a generalisation
of the more common model of information ow that measures the leakage from
high-level secret inputs of a function to its low-level public outputs [15]. It is
important to note that our information ow model measures the information
leakage from the value of variable at a particular point in the program. This
diers from (e.g.) the Jif [16] information ow model, which ensures that no
value stored in a high-level variable ever aects the value stored in a low-level
variable. We have previously [4] developed a formal model of this information
leakage, showed that it can be computed precisely for a simple probabilistic
language using discrete-time Markov chains and that it can be estimated from
trial runs of a program.
The LeakWatch API provides the command secret(v1) to denote that the
current value of the variable v1 should be kept secret, and observe(v2) to denote
that v2 is a value the attacker can observe; it is up to the analyst to decide
where to place these commands. We then measure the information leakage from
occurrences of v1 to occurrences of v2.
For example, consider a Java card game program in which a Card object
(theirCard) is drawn from a deck and sent over an insecure socket to an opposing
player. Another Card object (ourCard) is drawn from the deck and stored locally;
the opponent is then given the opportunity to make a bet based on the value
of theirCard. If an analyst wanted to estimate how much information a remote
attacker learns about ourCard from theirCard, the code could be annotated as:
Card theirCard = deck.drawCard();
LeakWatchAPI.observe(theirCard);
opponent.writeToSocket(theirCard);
Card ours = deck.drawCard();
LeakWatchAPI.secret(ours);
if (opponent.placedBet()) determineWinner();
This would, for example, alert the analyst to a badly-implemented random num-
ber generator in the deck-shuing algorithm that allows the opposing player to
predict the value of the next card dealt from the deck, giving them an unfair
advantage when deciding whether to bet.
We note that our measure of information leakage only tells us what a passive
attacker learns about the secret values by examining the observable values; it
does not measure how easy the secret value is to guess (e.g., because it has
low entropy). Therefore, the leakage measurement is only useful when there is
uncertainty about the secret values. This could be due to secret values being
randomly-generated numbers, or programs exhibiting unpredictable behaviour
such as process scheduling or network timing. In cases where the secret is an
input to the system, code can be added to generate a truly random value for the
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illustrating all of these cases in Section 6 and on the LeakWatch web site [13].
3 Estimating Min-Entropy Leakage
Our mutual information estimation result calculates the exact distribution of
the estimates and so lets us calculate exact condence intervals; obtaining a
similar result for min-entropy leakage is dicult because of the maximum in
its denition. So, to allow us to calculate this popular leakage measure, we nd
upper and lower bounds for a (more than) 95% condence interval.
The estimation gives a point estimate of the leakage L(X;Y ) from a dis-
tribution X on secret values to a distribution Y on observable values, and its
(more than) 95% condence interval. We do not know the exact distribution X,
so we estimate it from the trial run data. Since we do not know the exact joint
probability distribution p(x;y) for the system, we rst calculate the empirical
joint distribution from the trial runs. Let L be the total number of trial runs, and
^ s(x;y) be the frequency of (i.e., the number of trial runs with) a secret x 2 X
and an observable y 2 Y; then the empirical probability of having a secret x and
an observable y is dened by
^ s(x;y)
L . Also, let ^ u(x) be the frequency of a secret
x 2 X; i.e., ^ u(x) =
P
y2Y ^ s(x;y); then we calculate the empirical probability of
seeing x as
^ u(x)
L . Using these empirical distributions we obtain a point estimate
b L(X;Y ) of the min-entropy leakage:
b L(X;Y ) =  log2 max
x2X
^ u(x)
L
+ log2
X
y2Y
max
x2X
^ s(x;y)
L
.
Given L independent and identically distributed trial runs, the frequency ^ s(x;y)
follows the binomial distribution B(L;p(x;y)), where p(x;y) is the true joint
probability of a secret x and an observable y occurring. We note that we cannot
treat each of the empirical joint probabilities as independently sampled from a
binomial distribution, because together they must sum to 1. Instead, we perform
Pearson's 2 tests [17,18] for a large number L of trial runs.
The estimation of a condence interval is based on the fact that, with a high
probability, each observed frequency ^ s(x;y) is close to the \expected frequency"
p(x;y)L, where p(x;y) is the true probability we want to estimate. By applying
2 tests, we evaluate the probability that the observed frequencies ^ s(x;y) come
from the joint probability distributions p(x;y). Given the observed frequencies
^ s(x;y) and the expected frequencies p(x;y)L, the 2 test statistics is dened by:
2 =
X
x2X;y2Y
(^ s(x;y)   p(x;y)L)2
p(x;y)L
.
Since the joint probability distribution is regarded as a one-way table in this
setting, the 2 test statistics follows the 2 distribution with (#X  #Y)   1
degrees of freedom. We denote by 2
(0:05;k) the test statistics with upper tail area
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The goal of our new method is to obtain a (more than) 95% condence
interval of the min-entropy leakage L(X;Y ) between the secret and observable
distributions X, Y . To obtain this, we estimate the 95% condence intervals of
the min-entropy H1(X) =  log2 maxx2X p(x) and the conditional min-entropy
H1(Y jX) =  log2
P
y2Y maxx2X p(x;y) respectively.
We rst present a method for obtaining the condence interval of the
conditional min-entropy H1(Y jX). Given L independent and identically dis-
tributed trial runs of the system, we obtain the observed frequencies ^ s. Then
we construct expected frequencies smax that give the largest a posteriori
vulnerability
P
y2Y maxx2X p(x;y) among all expected frequencies that sat-
isfy: 2
(0:05;#X#Y 1) =
P
x2X;y2Y
(^ s(x;y) smax(x;y))
2
smax(x;y) . More specically, smax
is constructed from ^ s by increasing only the maximum expected frequencies
maxx2X ^ s(x;y) and by decreasing others, while keeping the total number of
frequencies as L; i.e.,
P
x2X;y2Y smax(x;y) = L. From smax we calculate the
empirical distribution Ppost
max [x;y] =
smax(x;y)
L . Next, we construct expected
frequencies smin that give the smallest a posteriori vulnerability. Keeping
the total number of frequencies as L, we repeatedly decrease the current
maximum expected frequency and increase the smallest frequencies until we
obtain 2
(0:05;#X#Y 1) =
P
x2X;y2Y
(^ s(x;y) smin(x;y))
2
smin(x;y) . Then we calculate the
corresponding distribution P
post
min . From Ppost
max and P
post
min we obtain the following
condence interval of the conditional min-entropy:
Lemma 1. The lower and upper bounds for the 95% condence interval of the
conditional min-entropy H1(Y jX) are respectively given by:
H low
1 (Y jX) =  log2
X
y2Y
max
x2X
Ppost
max [x;y]; H up
1 (Y jX) =  log2
X
y2Y
max
x2X
P
post
min [x;y].
Next, we compute the condence interval of the min-entropy H1(X). Given
the observed frequencies ^ u, we construct expected frequencies umax that give the
largest vulnerability max
x2X
p(x) such that 2
(0:05;#X 1) =
X
x2X
(^ u(x) umax(x))
2
umax(x) . We
calculate the empirical distribution Pprior
max [x] =
umax(x)
L . Similarly, we construct
expected frequencies umin giving the smallest vulnerability, and calculate the
corresponding distribution P
prior
min . Then we obtain the following:
Lemma 2. The lower and upper bounds for the 95% condence interval of the
min-entropy H1(X) are respectively given by:
H low
1 (X) =  log2 max
x2X
Pprior
max [x]; H up
1 (X) =  log2 max
x2X
P
prior
min [x].
Finally, we obtain a condence interval for the min-entropy leakage:
Theorem 3. The lower and upper bounds for a more than 95% condence in-
terval of the min-entropy leakage L(X;Y ) are respectively given by:
Llow(X;Y ) = H low
1 (X)   H up
1 (Y jX); Lup(X;Y ) = H up
1 (X)   H low
1 (Y jX).8 Tom Chothia, Yusuke Kawamoto, and Chris Novakovic
Note that our estimation technique for min-entropy leakage requires a large
number of trial runs (usually many more than that required to estimate mu-
tual information) to ensure that no more than 20% of the non-zero expected
frequencies are below 5, which is a prerequisite for 2 tests.
Fig. 1 shows an example of mutual information and min-entropy leakage
estimation; the graph is generated with 1,000 estimates of leakage from the 4-
diner DC-net described in depth in Section 6.1) in which the random bits are
biased towards 0 with probability 0:75. The graph shows the true leakage result,
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Fig.1. The sampling distributions of mutual
information and min-entropy leakage (and the
lower/upper bounds for min-entropy leakage's
condence interval).
the estimated results from 10,000
runs of LeakWatch, and the bounds
for min-entropy leakage. Our mu-
tual information result gives the
exact distribution of the estimates
and so LeakWatch calculates the ex-
act 95% condence interval.
In this case, we observe that the
estimation of min-entropy leakage
is slightly biased and that it demon-
strates more variation in the range
of results than mutual informa-
tion, although other examples (es-
pecially examples with unique max-
imum probabilities) demonstrate
more variation in the mutual infor-
mation estimate. In all cases, our
bounds for the mutual information
estimate are better than our bounds for min-entropy leakage; this is because we
nd the exact distribution of the estimates for mutual information and so can
nd a more accurate condence interval.
4 The Design of LeakWatch
LeakWatch is a robust tool intended for testing general-purpose, real-world Java
programs where the presence of information leakage vulnerabilities may be a
concern. It repeatedly executes a target program, recording the secret and ob-
servable values it encounters, and then uses the estimation results described in
Sections 2 and 3 to nd bounds on the information leakage from the program.
We target Java because of its enterprise popularity and common usage in
large software projects. LeakWatch requires minimal modications to be made
to the target program's source code: the analyst simply inserts calls to the
LeakWatch API methods, secret() and observe() (indicating the occurrence
of a secret and observable value respectively), identies the name of the main
class containing the target program's main method and instructs LeakWatch
to estimate the leakage from that program. The repeated execution of the pro-
gram in a manner that guarantees the correctness of the leakage estimation |LeakWatch: Estimating Information Leakage from Java Programs 9
including handling idiosyncrasies of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM), such as
class-loading | and computation of the leakage estimation are then performed
by LeakWatch. As the target program is repeatedly executed, LeakWatch auto-
matically determines whether the amount of secret and observable information
gathered is sucient to produce a reliable leakage estimation; no further user
interaction is required.
An important requirement of our statistical tests is that the sampled data is
independent and identically distributed. This requirement is easily fullled if the
target program does not rely on any external state (e.g., a value read from a le)
that may change between executions. Programs that rely on some external state
that does not have a statistically signicant eect on the observable behaviour
of the program can also be analysed without modication. It may be possible
to modify programs that do rely on external state (e.g., by replacing a network
read with a randomly generated value) and still obtain useful results.
4.1 Collecting Sucient Program Execution Data
For our estimation results to be meaningful, we must collect enough samples to
ensure that the estimated joint distribution of the secret and observable informa-
tion that occurs in the program is a close approximation of the true distribution.
Recall from Theorem 2 that the mean and variance of the distribution from which
mutual information estimates are drawn are both dened as Taylor series. For
eciency reasons, LeakWatch only evaluates the rst-order Taylor polynomial
(e.g., ^ I(X;Y ) (#X  1)(#Y  1)=2n for the point estimate of mutual informa-
tion). Evaluating more terms in the Taylor series is computationally expensive
because the joint distribution of X and Y must be enumerated dierently for
each term. For a small number of samples n, it is likely that the O(n 2) and
higher-order terms are too large for the rst-order Taylor polynomial to be a good
approximation of the sum of the series, and so ^ I(X;Y ) (#X  1)(#Y  1)=2n
will change as n increases. However, for a large enough number of samples, the
higher-order terms quickly become small enough to have no meaningful eect
on the result, and ^ I(X;Y )   (#X   1)(#Y   1)=2n will no longer change as n
increases.
Based on this observation, LeakWatch uses the following heuristic to auto-
matically determine when a sucient amount of trial run data has been collected
to minimise the higher-order terms in the Taylor series and therefore provide an
accurate mutual information estimate. It computes an estimate ^ I(X;Y ) after
max(#X  #Y;100) samples have been collected, and stops collecting samples
if all of the following conditions are met:
1) #X, #Y > 1 (otherwise a leakage measure cannot be computed from the
joint probability distribution);
2) #X and #Y have remained constant since these conditions were last checked
(otherwise the values in condition 4 cannot be compared meaningfully);
3) the minimum number of samples (4  #X  #Y) has been collected;
4) the value ^ I(X;Y ) (#X  1)(#Y  1)=2n has not changed beyond a certain
amount, con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(otherwise the higher-order Taylor series terms are non-negligible).
If these conditions are not met, the process is repeated again when #X  #Y
more samples have been collected.
This heuristic allows LeakWatch to produce accurate mutual information es-
timates and condence intervals for target programs containing both small and
large numbers of unique secret and observable values that occur with a non-
negligible probability. The initial number of samples max(#X  #Y;100) pre-
vents LeakWatch from terminating too early when analysing very small systems
(e.g., those containing fewer than ten unique secret and observable values in
total) due to the low value of #X  #Y in these systems.
To estimate min-entropy leakage, we need many more trial runs than we need
to estimate mutual information. As mentioned in Section 3, we require that no
more than 20% of the non-zero expected frequencies are below 5; LeakWatch
therefore collects samples until this condition as well as the rst three conditions
in the above procedure for mutual information estimation are met.
5 Implementing LeakWatch
To test a program for information leakage, an analyst simply imports the
LeakWatch API class into their Java program and tags the secret and publicly-
observable data with the API's secret() and observe() methods. Execution
and sandboxing of the target program are achieved using the core Java libraries,
and leakage estimates are calculated by leakiEst [19,20], our information leakage
estimation library for Java, which now implements our min-entropy leakage re-
sult from Section 3; this ensures that LeakWatch is not tethered to a particular
version or implementation of the JVM specication.
We now discuss two implementation issues: ensuring the independence of tar-
get program executions, and automatically providing programs with simulated
user input.
5.1 Ensuring the Independence of Target Program Executions
When a Java program is executed, a new JVM is created; this involves loading
and uncompressing many megabytes of Java class les. To generate test data ef-
ciently, LeakWatch uses the same JVM to execute each trial run of the program.
However, ensuring that programs sharing the same JVM execute independently
(a requirement for our statistical estimation method) is not trivial to guarantee.
Java programs consist of one or more classes that are loaded into memory
on-demand; the task of locating the bytecode that denes a class, parsing the
bytecode, and returning a reference to the new class to the caller is performed
by a classloader, itself a Java class. A class with a given name may be loaded
only once by a given classloader. The JVM contains three classloaders by default,
arranged in a hierarchy: the bootstrap classloader loads the core Java classes (e.g.,
those whose names begin with java.), the extensions classloader loads the Java
extension classes (e.g., those that perform cryptographic operations), and theLeakWatch: Estimating Information Leakage from Java Programs 11
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Fig.2. The LeakWatch classloader hierarchy. Multiple
copies of the target program can be executed simulta-
neously and in isolation using separate instances of the
LeakWatch classloader.
system classloader loads
other classes. This hier-
archy is strictly enforced;
e.g., the system class-
loader delegates the load-
ing of java.lang.String
to the extensions class-
loader, which in turn del-
egates it to the boot-
strap classloader. By de-
fault, this means that
both LeakWatch's classes
and the target program's
classes are loaded by the
system classloader.
LeakWatch runs the target program by invoking the main method in the
target program's main class and waiting for it to return. Because a class may
contain static member variables, having the system classloader load the target
program's classes would be problematic: LeakWatch would not be able to \re-
set" the value of static member variables present in the target program's classes
before invoking the main class's main method again, so some state may be pre-
served between executions of the target program. This potentially violates the
independence of trial runs.
LeakWatch solves this problem by loading target program classes with its
own classloader, positioned in the hierarchy between the system classloader and
any classloaders used by the target program (see Fig. 2). Before each invocation
of the main class's main method, a new LeakWatch classloader is initialised; it
contains only the denition of the main class. As the main method executes,
the LeakWatch classloader creates a new instance of any class required by the
target program; subsequent requests for the class with that name will return
this instance of the class, rather than the instance that would usually be re-
turned by the system classloader. When the main method returns, LeakWatch
destroys this classloader (and therefore any class loaded by it), ensuring that
earlier invocations of the main method cannot interfere with future invocations.
This guarantee even holds when multiple instances of the LeakWatch classloader
exist concurrently, allowing LeakWatch to perform multiple isolated invocations
of the main method at the same time using multithreading.
If a class is usually loaded by either the bootstrap or extensions classloaders,
the LeakWatch classloader must delegate the request to them, so all executions
of the target program \see" the same copies of the Java API classes. Although
information could be shared between executions in this way, it is only possible
with methods in a handful of classes (e.g., java.lang.System's setProperty()
method) and it is easy for the analyst to verify whether they are used.12 Tom Chothia, Yusuke Kawamoto, and Chris Novakovic
5.2 Automatically Providing User Input to Target Programs
So that programs that rely on user input can be tested for information leakage,
LeakWatch allows the analyst to specify an input strategy that provides input
values to the program based on observable values that have previously occurred.
To ensure independence of trial runs of the target program, we place two re-
strictions on LeakWatch's behaviour: only one input strategy may be dened for
all trial runs, and the input values provided by the input strategy must depend
only on the observable values that have occurred in the current trial run, and
not in other trial runs. In previous work [4], we proved that if a program leaks
information for any input strategy then it will also leak a non-zero amount of
information for the input strategy that selects all possible inputs uniformly, so
the uniform input strategy is a good default strategy.
Input can be provided to Java programs in many ways. We focus on input
provided via the standard input stream, a universal method of supplying data
to software; in Java, this stream is accessed with the static member variable
System.in of type java.io.InputStream, whose read() method returns the
next byte from the input buer.
Operating systems provide a single standard input stream to a process;
this means that all classes loaded by a particular JVM read from the same
System.in stream. This is problematic because LeakWatch's classes and the tar-
get program's classes all execute within the same JVM; even though LeakWatch
sandboxes each execution of the target program using its own classloader, all
instances of the target program will share (and therefore read from) the same
input stream. This is most noticeable when using multithreading to perform
multiple isolated executions of the target program concurrently: two instances
of a program reading 20 bytes of input from System.in will conict, each using
the read() method to read approximately 10 bytes from the same stream. This
leaves both instances of the program with meaningless input, and violates the
requirement that trial runs be independent and identically distributed.
We solve both problems by transforming every target class that reads from
the standard input stream to instead read from an input driver, a mock object
that mimics System.in. When using LeakWatch to analyse a program that reads
from the standard input stream, the analyst must also write an appropriate input
driver to supply input when it is required. The purpose of the input driver is to
implement the input strategy described above: like System.in, it is a subclass of
java.io.InputStream, but its read() method may consult the list of observable
values that have been encountered so far during execution and return a stream
of bytes comprising the selected input to the target program. When classes are
loaded by LeakWatch's classloader, their bytecode is dynamically transformed
(using the ASM [21] library) so that all references to System.in are replaced
with references to the analyst's input driver. The loading of the input driver
class is also performed by LeakWatch's classloader, so each execution of the
target program believes it alone is reading from the standard input stream;
this means that concurrent executions of a target program that reads from the
standard input stream can progress without interfering with each other.LeakWatch: Estimating Information Leakage from Java Programs 13
6 Practical Applications
We now present three examples demonstrating how LeakWatch can be applied
to real-world situations to detect the presence of information leaks, quantify
their size, and remove or mitigate them; they were benchmarked on a desktop
computer with a quad-core CPU and 4GB of RAM. The source code for these
examples is available for download from [13].
6.1 A Poorly-Implemented Multi-Party Computation Protocol
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Diner 2
:11 = 1
Diner 3
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Fig.3. An overview of the Java DC-net implementation.
Diner 2 pays the bill; the nal result is 1, indicating that
one of the Diners paid.
The dining cryptog-
raphers problem [22] in-
vestigates how anonymity
can be guaranteed during
secure multi-party com-
putation. Informally: a
group of cryptographers
dine at a restaurant, and
the waiter informs them
that the bill is to be paid
anonymously; it may be
paid by any of the din-
ers, or (e.g.) by the na-
tional security agent sit-
ting at an adjacent table.
After the bill has been paid, how do the diners collectively discover whether one
of them paid the bill, while respecting their fellow diners' right to anonymity?
The DC-net is a solution to the dining cryptographers problem; it provides
unconditional sender and recipient untraceability. Briey, each diner generates
a random bit visible only to them and the diner to their left, giving each diner
sight of two separate randomly-generated bits; each diner computes the XOR
of these two bits and announces the result publicly to the rest of the table |
except for the payer, who announces the inverse of their XOR computation. The
XOR of the announcements themselves allow each diner to verify whether one
of them paid: if this value is 1, one of the diners claimed to have paid; if it is
0, nobody claimed to have paid. This protocol preserves the anonymity of the
payer; however, care must be taken when implementing the protocol to ensure
that side-channels do not leak information about the payer's identity.
This example implements a multithreaded, object-oriented DC-net in Java
(see Fig. 3). Four Diners are seated at a Table and | for the purposes of
verifying whether the code contains an information leak | one of them is ran-
domly selected to be the payer; the identity of the payer is marked as a secret
with secret(). The Diners then concurrently execute the protocol described
above: they privately exchange their randomly-generated bits with each other
using the socket libraries in the Java API, and the payer sends their payment
details to the Waiter over another private socket. The Diners then announce the14 Tom Chothia, Yusuke Kawamoto, and Chris Novakovic
results of their XOR computation to the rest of the Table; the messages sent
to the Table's socket are publicly visible, and are marked as observable with
observe(). LeakWatch then answers the question \what does a passive attacker
learn about the payer's identity by watching the messages sent to the Table?".
After 2,600 trial runs (taking 9 minutes to perform the required number of
trial runs and 300ms to calculate the leakage estimate), LeakWatch estimates that
there are ca. 1.15 of a possible 2 bits of mutual information between the identity
of the payer and the messages the Diners broadcast to the Table. The min-
entropy leakage is found to be 0.47 bits after 6,080 trial runs; 11 minutes were
spent performing the trial runs, and 221ms were spent calculating the estimate.
Although the messages themselves reveal no information about the identity of
the payer, the order in which they are sent does: the additional time taken by
the payer to send their payment details to the Waiter means that, more often
than not, they are one of the last Diners to announce the result of their XOR
computation to the Table. This leakage can be eliminated in several ways; e.g.,
modifying the implementation so that each Diner waits 100ms before sending
their announcement to the Table's socket makes it more likely that messages will
arrive at the Table's socket in any order. After 5,700 trial runs of this modied
DC-net, LeakWatch conrms that there is no leakage of the payer's identity.
By increasing the number of Diners participating in the DC-net, the com-
munication protocol becomes more complex, and the amount of observable in-
formation increases exponentially. Fig. 5 (3 pages below) shows the amount of
time LeakWatch takes to estimate the leakage from a simplied DC-net, with
all socket-based communication removed and a new leak caused by biased ran-
dom bit generation inserted (a 0 is generated with probability 0.75, rather than
0.5). The graph shows that, as more Diners are added to this simplied DC-net,
the amount of time LeakWatch takes to perform a number of trial runs that is
sucient to compute an accurate leakage estimate increases exponentially (ca.
2 hours when 17 Diners participate). The amount of time required to estimate
the size of the leak also increases exponentially, but remains comparatively very
small (ca. 12 seconds when 17 Diners participate), indicating that the vast ma-
jority of LeakWatch's time is spent collecting sucient trial run data, and not
computing leakage estimates.
6.2 Analysing the Design of Stream Ciphers
Crypto-1 is a stream cipher used to encrypt transmissions in commercial RFID
tags. The design of this cipher was kept secret, but careful analysis (e.g., [23])
revealed that it is based on a 48-bit linear feedback shift register (LFSR). Each
keystream bit is generated by applying two functions (fa, fb) to 20 bits of the
state, and then applying a third function (fc) to the outputs of these functions.
In this example we use LeakWatch to show that the mutual information between
the state bits and the keystream bits reveals much of this structure.
The initial state of the LFSR is derived from the key; to simplify the ex-
ample, we assume that we can set the initial state directly. Information about
the structure of Crypto-1 is revealed by loading di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LFSR and observing the output from the nal Boolean function fc. Using a Java
implementation of Crypto-1, an LFSR is created with a randomly-generated ini-
tial state, and the rst output bit from fc is computed. The value of this bit
is marked as observable with observe(). Another LFSR is created with the
same initial state as before, but with the value of the bit at index i ipped with
probability 1
2 | the decision about whether or not to ip this bit is marked as
secret information with secret(). The output from fc in this second cipher is
then computed, and its value is also marked as observable with observe(). The
question being asked here is \what is the correlation between the LFSR bit at
index i being ipped and the output of fc changing?"; informally, this can be
seen as the inuence of the bit at index i on the cipher's keystream.
By running LeakWatch 48 times, each time using a dierent value of i be-
tween 0 and 47 (taking a total of 19 seconds to perform the trial runs and a
total of 425ms to produce the 48 leakage estimates), LeakWatch reveals which
indices of the LFSR are tapped and passed as input to the Boolean functions;
each execution of LeakWatch performs approximately 220 trial runs to determine
the inuence that that particular bit has on the keystream. Fig. 4 graphs the
inuence of each LFSR bit on the output of the cipher; points that fall above the
dashed line near the x axis indicate a statistically signicant correlation between
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Key bit index
Zero leakage upper bound (bits)
Mutual information (bits)
Fig.4. The inuence over the rst bit of the keystream
of each bit in a 48-bit secret initial state for Crypto-1.
ipping the LFSR bit
at the index on the x
axis and the rst bit
of the keystream chang-
ing. By reading o these
indices on the x axis,
we see which bits are
tapped to produce the
keystream. Moreover, the
relative vertical distances
between the points for
each group of four indices
reveal two distinctive pat-
terns: these are the Boolean functions fa and fb (i.e., the pattern for groups
f9;11;13;15g and f33;35;37;39g represents fa, and the pattern for groups
f17;19;21;23g, f25;27;29;31g and f41;43;45;47g represents fb); it is therefore
possible to \see" which indices are tapped by each of these functions, as indi-
cated by the dashed lines between the points in each group. The slight variation
in the groups' distances from the x axis is accounted for by the third Boolean
function fc, into which the output from the other Boolean functions is fed.
This analysis shows that the output of this popular but awed cipher reveals
a lot of information about its internal design; it is therefore unsurprising that
the cipher's design was fully reverse-engineered. The same technique can also be
used to analyse other LFSR-based stream ciphers, such as Hitag-2 [24].16 Tom Chothia, Yusuke Kawamoto, and Chris Novakovic
6.3 Recipient Disclosure in OpenPGP Encrypted Messages
OpenPGP [25] is a data encryption standard. In a typical usage scenario, en-
crypted OpenPGP messages contain two packets: the rst contains a randomly-
generated symmetric session key encrypted with the recipient's public key, and
the second contains the sender's message, encrypted under the session key. Al-
though OpenPGP provides message condentiality and integrity, it does not
necessarily provide recipient condentiality because the rst packet contains the
recipient's key ID | the low 64 bits of the SHA-1 hash of their public key
| which may be used to corroborate the recipient's identity with a resource
mapping public keys to identities, such as an OpenPGP key server.
To demonstrate this, we present an example where two principals attempt to
communicate securely using OpenPGP while concealing their identities from a
passive attacker with the ability to read messages sent over the communication
medium; the OpenPGP API is provided by the BCPG Java library [26]. In
the program, a sender is chosen randomly from a pool of six principals, and
a recipient is chosen from the remaining ve; their identities are both marked
as secret (with secret()). The sender greets the recipient by name, encrypts
the greeting with the recipient's public key, and sends the encrypted message
over an insecure medium, where it is monitored by the attacker. Two pieces of
information are marked as observable by the attacker using separate calls to
observe(): the header of the rst packet in the encrypted OpenPGP message,
and the length (in bytes) of the entire encrypted message. Thus, LeakWatch
answers the question \how much information does an attacker learn about the
principals' identities by observing these two features of the encrypted trac?".
Assuming the two principals are selected uniformly, there are ca. 4.9 bits of
secret information in this scenario (ca. 2.6 bits from the sender's identity and
ca. 2.3 bits from the recipient's identity). After 550 trial runs (taking 17 seconds
to perform the required number of trial runs and 300ms to produce the leakage
estimate), LeakWatch reveals that, because BCPG includes the recipient's key ID
in the rst packet, there is a leakage of ca. 2.52 bits about the secret information:
there is complete leakage of the recipient's identity, and a further leakage of ca.
0.2 bits of the sender's identity, because the attacker also knows that the sender
is not the recipient.
Some OpenPGP implementations mitigate this leakage of the recipient's iden-
tity; e.g., GnuPG features a -R option that replaces the key ID in the rst packet
with a string of null bytes. By patching BCPG to do the same, the leakage de-
creases to ca. 1.86 bits after 350 trial runs: the recipient's identity is no longer
leaked completely via the rst packet, but because the attacker knows the for-
mat of the unencrypted message being sent, the length of the second packet still
reveals some information about the recipient's identity (because the sender's
encrypted message will be longer when greeting a recipient with a longer name).
Fig. 5 shows how increasing the number of bits in the rst packet that are
observable by the attacker aects LeakWatch's execution time. It reveals a result
similar to that in Section 6.1: as the number of bits in the observable output
increases, the amount of time required for LeakWatch to perform the numberLeakWatch: Estimating Information Leakage from Java Programs 17
of trial runs required to estimate leakage increases exponentially (ca. 6 hours
when the observation size reaches 132 bits); this is because of the exponentially-
increasing number of trial runs required to verify whether parts of the randomly-
generated encrypted session key leak information about the principals' identities.
The amount of time required to estimate the size of the information leak from
the trial run data, however, remains comparatively very small (ca. 1.5 seconds
when the observation size reaches 132 bits), as it does in Section 6.1.
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Fig.5. The eect on LeakWatch's execution time of increasing the amount of secret
or observable information in the examples in Sections 6.1 (the number of Diners, left)
and 6.3 (the number of observable bits in the encrypted OpenPGP message, right).
7 Conclusion
We have presented new theoretical results and practical techniques for the sta-
tistical estimation of information leakage from real-world Java programs, based
on trial runs. In particular, we have described a new method for estimating min-
entropy leakage and its condence interval, and a technique for ensuring the
collection of a sucient number of samples. We have also presented a mecha-
nism that ensures the independence of trial runs of Java programs, and applied
our information leakage model and estimation techniques to input-consuming
Java programs. Using three examples, we have demonstrated that our robust
information leakage analysis tool LeakWatch can uncover information leakage
vulnerabilities in Java programs.
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